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IMPACT OF SUBORDINATE THREATS ON LEADERS' PAY ALLOCATION
DECISIONS
Mark Fulford, Univers ity of Central M issouri
In many different conte.:cts within organizations today, attempts are made by direct reports to influence the
decisions of their leaders. In no context does the resulting decision hit closer to home for a direct report
than those related to the allocation of pay raises. Un der what conditions are attempts by direct reports to
influence their leaders' pay allocation decisions most effective? Wit at effect does a threat by the
subordinate have on th e leader's decision ? Does the severity of th e threat used matter? In an attempt to
answer these questions, a study was conducted of leaders' pay allocation decisions under the conditions of
varying levels of dependence and varying levels of severity of threat used by a focal direct report. Results
indicated support for the interactive effects between dependence and dependency threats on leaders' pay
allocation decisions (i.e. , leaders allocated significantly higher increases to those direct reports upon
whom they were highly dependent only when the direct report threatened the dependence relationship).
Support was also found for the effects of threat severity (i.e., when the leader was highly dependenton the
subordinate, more severe threats led to higher allocations). The results allow a m ore complete
understanding of managerial pay allocation decisions and provide the g roundwork for additional
research.

INTRODUCTION
Pay has been shown to have sign ificant effects on the
attitudes and behaviors of employees (Law ler, 198 l e). In
attempting to in crease employee moti vation , man y
organizations ha ve implemented merit pay programs.
However, such programs have come under severe
scrutiny for appearin g to recogn ize and reward fa ctors
other than perfom1ance (thus vio latin g the " merit"
principle) .
Many of the in vestigations into thi s area have focu sed
on the heuristi cs (or dec ision-making stTategies) used by
allocators (Deshpa nde & Schoderbek, 1993; Hi ggin s,
Judge, & Ferris, 200 3); the ass umption is that all ocators
(some more than others) are subconsc iou sly bi ased by
factors other than performance. However, it is also
possible, in some cases, that all ocators are well awa re
that their pay allocation dec isions are inconsistent wi th
what is merited based solely on performance. [t is
plausible that some a ll ocators are reacting to ''upwa rd
influence attempts" (Kipni s, Schm idt, & W ilkinson ,
1980; Yuki & Fa lbe, 1990) by their direc t reports who
hope to receive pay all ocations in excess of that whi ch is
merited by their perfonmn ce alone (Thacker, 1998). If
this is the case, under what cond iti ons mi ght these
attempts be most successful ?
Depen dence
According to French & Raven ( 1959) , pay is a so urce
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of rewa rd power which an allocator ca n use to influence
the beha vior of direct reports. However, reciproca l
influence is poss ibl e as wel l. Bartol & Martin ( 1988)
argue that man agers use pay not on ly as a reward for
perfom1ance, but also as a way to mana ge their
dependencies on direct reports. As they point out,
"Indi vidu als possess power beca use oth ers are dependent
upon them for access to resources that ca nn ot be obtained
eas il y elsewhere", (p. 364) .
O ne so urce of dependence on direct reports is the
possess ion of ski ll s whi ch are not easi ly repl aced from
the labor poo l (Barto l & Martin, 1988; Pfeffer, 198 1).
Freedman & Montanari ( 1980) state, "e mpl oyees who
possess ski ll s that are in high demand are in powerful
positi ons relative to th e organ ization . Th is power can be
used to sh ift the emphasis of man agerial goa Is for th e
rewa rd progra m from performance to attraction and
retenti on", (p. 387). Kante r ( 1977) proposes several
so urces that may create a situation of dependenc y of th e
leader on the subordin ate: perfom1ance monitorship
(w hen performance becomes more difficult to monitor);
perfom1ance visibili ty (when more individual s are aware
of th e outcomes of ones perfonnance); speciali zed skill
(w hen the d irec t report possesses skills th e leader does
no t) ; task centra li ty (when the tasks pe rformed by the
di rect report are part of th e leader' s cuiTent agenda) ; and
organi zat iona l connec ti ons (when the direct report ipo litically connec ted wit hin the orga ni zation).
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Oepend ence Thr·eat
G iven th at leaders are depende nt o n every subo rdina te
to so me exte nt, w ha t other facto rs a ffec t ma nage ri a l pay
a ll oca ti o n dec is io ns? Accordin g to Barto l & M artin
( 198 8), leaders must ca re full y co nsider the types o f
re la tionships w hi c h ex is t be tween the mse lves and each o f
the ir d irect re po rts. T hey propo e that leaders w ill no t
o nl y cons ider th e degree of de pe ndence o n a particul ar
d irect re port, but a lso the potenti a l threa t to the
de pe nde ncy re lati onship. In othe r word s, a ll ocato rs will
o nl y " pay"
fo r de pend ence w hen tha t depe nde nce
re la ti o nship is threatened . De pe nde ncy threats are made
in o ne of severa l ways: po tenti al di rect repo rt turnove r,
in c luding move ment w ithin the o rga ni zati o n; po te ntia l
dec lin es in criti ca l d irect re po rt be ha vio rs in de pendence
a rea (e .g ., reduced produc tivity, increased absentee ism,
less wi llin gness to share spec ia li zed kn o w ledge/skill s,
etc.) ; and po te ntia l subver ive ac ti ons aga in t the
supe
. rvi sor
Ba rtol & Ma rtin ( 1989) pro posed severa l co nd it io ns
that sho ul d result in a larger th a n no rm a l pay increase
fro m the a ll oca to r: I) the req uest i tro ng e no ugh to
constitute a de pe nde ncy threa t, 2) the ituatio n provi de
so me ho pe o f reso lvin g the pro b le m with be tter pay , a nd
3) the de ma nd i no t so stro ng that it is perce ived as a
d irec t cha ll e nge to th e po we r o f the a ll oca to r. Under low
de pe nde nce cond iti o ns, it is tho ug ht tha t threa ts o f any
( i.e ., the lea de r does not re ly
kind w ill no t be c flcvccti
heav ily u po n the subo rd ina te; th ere fo re, threa ts o f any
kind do no t ha ve to be tolera ted). Und er hig h de pe ndence
cond iti o ns, it i th ou g ht that th rea ts are mo re e ffecti ve as
th e ir severi ty in creases-up to a po int. Re me mbe r that pay
a ll oca ti o n is a way fo r the lead e r to ma inta in conb·o l over
de pe nde nc ies. G iven a direct re port, upo n w ho m th e
leade r is hi g hl y de pe nde nt, ma kin g exec s ive de mands o r
threa ts, the leade r 's contro l is threa te ned . T here fo re, the
lea der may in it ia ll y awa rd a high inc rease in o rder to
resto re contro l, but, pe rh aps du e to psyc hologica l
reacta nce (B re hm , 1966), th e leader's pe rcept ion o f the
direct re po rt may beco me mo re nega tive a nd , in the lo ng
run , may res ul t in a tte mp t by th e lea de r to gel ri d o f th e
tro uble ma ke r (T ha c ke r & Wayne, 1995) . O ne way to do
th 1s may be to in te nti o na ll y awa rd low in creases to
prom pt the direc l re po rt to ·ever the re la ti o ns hip.

ll ypot hcsis
I : Lea ders'
pa y a ll oca tio n
dec is io ns arc a ffcc ted by de pe ndence o n the
s u bo rdin ::~te
o nly w he n th e subo rd ina te
threa te ns th e de pe nde ncy re lati o ns hip .
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Hypothesis 2: Whe n leaders are highly
de pende nt o n subo rdin ates, the ir pay allocation
dec is io ns are direc tl y re lated to the severity of
subordin ates' threa ts to the de pende nce
re latio nship.
V ery littl e e mpiri ca l work has been conducte d in these
a reas. A a ma tter o f fac t, there are onl y two studies
w hi c h ha ve investi gated the depende nce-depe ndency
threa t in terac ti on (B arto l & M artin , 1990; 1989). Up to
thi s po int, there have been no in vesti ga ti o ns of the e ffects
o f va ry in g le ve ls of de pendency threat severity on pay
a ll ocation dec is io n In eac h of the two studi es noted
above, de pende ncy threa t d id no t vary; it w as e ither
present or a bsent. In a n atte mpt to determine the e ffects
o f thr eat severi ty o n the pa y a ll ocati ons of leade rs who
a re de pendent o n the foca l direct report, a study of
ma nageri a l pay a ll oca ti o n dec is io ns was undertaken. By
lookin g at two types o f in n ue nce tacti c w hich differ in
se ve rity (a n a pproac h no t investigated pre viously) , a long
with de pe nde nce issues, th is research will exte nd the
pre vi o us work in thi s area a nd w ill lay the groundwork
to wa rd a mo;o
rC' m plct c understand ing of managerial pay
a ll oca ti o n deci s io ns.

M eth odo logy
Beca use pay is suc h a se ns iti ve iss ue within
o rga ni za ti on s, ga inin g access to the pay a ll ocati on
deci s io ns of leaders is diffi c ult. Ho wever, it is possible to
rec reate s itua tions fo r th ose w ith pay a ll oca ti on
cx pe n c ncc w here th e ir dec is io ns are mo re eas il y
ca ptured . O ne hundred fo urteen pa rti c ipants m a
leade r h ip dcve lo pme nl pro~:,•Ta m a t a metTo po li ta n area
un ive rs ity loca ted in the Mid weste rn Uni ted States served
as the s tud y sa mp le. Becau se most o f the e indi vidua ls
w ere e mp loyed full -ti me w ithin o rga ni za ti ons, it was
assumed tha t a su ffic ient nu mber of the m wo uld have
ex pe ri e nce ma kin g pa y a ll ocati on dec ision .
An in -baske t exerc ise wa used in w hi ch the pay
a ll oca tio n i s ue wa s e mbedd ed . Subjects were in tructed
to ass ume th e ro le o f a new ly a ppo inted V ice-Pres
ide nt in
c harge o f th e c red it ana lys is unit o f a reg iona l
co mme rc ia l ba nk. Accord in g to the in fo rma ti o n provided,
th e prev io us un it head had le ft o n s hort noti ce to take a
hi g her leve l pos itio n at a no ther ba nk. Eac h subj ec t wa s
rred
o fC
m
fr
a n a rea ba nk tha t
to ld tha t they had been trans
had ju t bee n acq uired by the reg io na l bank . T he prev ious
uni t head prov ided so me bri ef bac kgro und info rmati o n
rega rd ing th e job: the wor k load had been unu sua ll y
heavy la te ly a nd ge ll in g and kee pin g qua lifi ed peopl e had
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been a continuing difficulty. Information was provided
regarding the subject's new staff of five cred it analysts,
including name, tenure with the regional bank, previous
place of employment, and spec ial area of experti se. All of
the analysts were given gender neutral first names to
avoid confounding the study manipulation s with gender
effects. The focal analyst was described as hav ing been
with the regional bank for three years and speciali zed in
"high growth companies, parti cul arl y involvin g loans to
be secured by accounts receivabl e and/or inventory (often
referred to as 'asset based lendin g')." None of the other
analysts were described as havin g thi s special area of
expertise.
The situation was depicted as a Sunday afternoon ; no
one else was in the office, the fil es were locked, and the
subject had arrived at the office for the first time. In
addition, the subject would be leaving that evening fo r an
important bank trainin g program that wou ld last a week
and would not leave time to do any office work. Hence,
any pressing matters had to be handled prior to leav ing. A
memo from the Vice President of Human Resources
indicated that recommended pay rai ses had to be turned
in on an attached fom1 by the deadline, three days away .
The memo further stated that if the recommendation s
were not received by the due date, fifty percent of the unit
raise money would automatica ll y revert back to the
central merit pool. Each subj ect had to make the meri t
increase recommendations, beca use the previous unit
head sent a memo to the subj ect stating that he felt the
new department head shou ld determine the pay raises .
The previous unit head includ ed hi s most recent
appraisals of the staffs ind ividua l performance. The
rating scale contai ned five leve ls. ra ngmg from
exceptional to unsati s factory. Onl y the top three levels
(exceptional, commend ab le, and good) were assign ed to
the five analysts. The foca l ana lyst wa s given a
commendable rating.
The memo from the vice presid ent of HR also
informed subj ects that $ 17,500 was avai lab le for
di stribution among th e five anal ysts. Th e attac hed merit
rai se recommendation form contai ned the names of the
analysts and their c urrent sa laries, which ra nged from
$28,000 to $40,000, along with a set of box es in whi ch to
place the recommendation. The current sa lary for the
focal anal yst was $36,000, makin g him/her the third
hi ghest pa id anal yst.
Two levels of dependence we re created ; low and hi gh.
The dependence va ri ab le wa s manipul ated by a copy of a
memo from the Exec utive Vice Preseid nt of Loan s to th e
indi vidua l to whom the s ubj ects directly reported
indicating a shi ft in strateg ic directions by the bank 's
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strategic pl anning committee. [n the low dependence
condition, the memo stated that there wou ld be less
emphasis on commercial lending to hi gh growth
co mpani es. Th is shi ft in strategic direction lowered the
dependence on the focal analyst relative to the other
analysts who had ex perti se in more traditi ona l lend ing
areas . In the hi gh dependence cond iti on , the memo stated
that the strategic planning committee had decided to shift
toward greater emphasis on co mmercial lending to hi gh
growth companies. T hi s shift had the effect of rai sin g
dependence on the foca l ana lyst since non e of the other
ana lysts had this experti se.
Three levels of dependency threat were created; low,
medi um, and hi gh. It should be poin ted out, however, that
the hi gh condition wa s not meant to be so severe as to
cause the " reactance" phenomenon (Brehm, 1966) as
proposed by Bartol & Martin (1988). It wa s only meant
to be more severe than the medium condition in order to
test the effects of threat severi ty. Thi s variabl e was al so
manipulated via memo contained in the exercise. In the
hi gh threat severity condition, the focal analyst
acknow ledged that merit rai se recom mendation s were
due shortl y and that a substantial increase was expected .
The focal ana lyst also threatened the subj ect by indi cating
that if a substantial increase were not rece ived , an offer of
employment received from a competin g firm would be
accepted . In the moderate threat severity condition , the
foca l
analyst
acknow ledged
that
meri t
ra1se
recommendati ons were due shortl y and that, if a sizeab le
increase were not received , he/she may have to begin
explorin g other alternatives . In the low threat severi ty
condition , the foca l ana lyst infom1ed the subj ect that
he/she was appl yin g to the bank for a mortgage loa n,
because he/she was building a new house.
Suhj ects were asked, as part of the in-ba sket exerc ise,
to al locate merit pay to all five analysts whose
perfom1ance appraisa l ratings were provided. However ,
the on ly informati on of interest was that pertaining to the
a ll ocation s made for the foca l ana lyst. Therefore, the
dependent variab le represented the dollar a mount of the
reco mmended increase for the foca l an alyst.
A 2x3 between-subj ects factorial des ign was used in thi s
study (all manipul ation s were chec ked in a pi lo t stud y
and found to be operatin g as expected). Ba ed upon th e
res ults from a Power Anal ys is proced ure o utlined by
Cohen ( 19 77), the target wa s at leas t 15 subj ects per ce ll.
T hu s, a minimum o f 90 subj ects wa s des ired . As
indica ted ea rli er, I 14 s ubj ects went through the in-basket
exe rc ise. However, onl y I 04 of th ose subj ec ts provided
comp lete in fo rmati on on a ll of th e varia bl es of int erest.
Th e number o f subjects in the fina l study still exceeds the
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number required by the power analysis. Of the I 04
s ubj ects that pro vided comp lete infonnation , 15 were in
the low-l ow trea tment condition , 17 were in the lowmedium treatment condition , 18 were in the low-hi gh
trea tment condition , 18 we re in the hi gh-l ow treatment
condition , 19 were 111 the hi gh-medium treatment
conditi o n, and 17 were in
the hi gh-hi gh treatment
conditio n .
An analys is of variance (ANOV A) was used to test
the ma in effects of de pe ndence and de pendency threat
severity, as well as the interacti on effect between them,
o n subj ects ' pay a ll ocation dec is ions. ln order to fully test
for the effects of threat severity, one -way ANOV As w e re
used to test the mean di ffe rences across stud y condition s.
As a result, subj ect de mographi cs were as follows:

59% ma le, 41 % female ; 48% of the men had experience
supervi sing the work of others , while 33% of the women
had such experience; 43 % of the men had made merit
a llocation s previously, while 33% of the women had
made merit a ll ocations previously, meaning 39% of all
subjects had this experience prior to the study; the
average number of years of work experience for the
entire subj ec t population was 7.2 years, with a range from
1-23 yea rs; there were no significant differences in years
of work ex perience between the men and the women .
Tab le I illustrates the mean salary mcrease
recommendations for the focal analyst (the direct report
upon w hom subj ects were dependent and by whom they
were threatened) according to each of the study
condition s.

Tab le 1: Mean Pay Increase Recommendations (in Dollars)
for th e F ocal Analyst b y Each Study C ondition
Depend ency T hrea t Severity
Low
Med 1um
High

High Oe~cnd e ncc
$3643 .78
$3699.70
$4080.82

Low Dep endence
$36 15.43
$3749.4 1
$3665.28

T.n order to statisti ca ll y de te nnin e w hether managerial
pay a llocation dec is ions a re affected by the presence of
dependency relations hips o nl y when the dependency

re l atio n s hi p ~ are threatened (i.e. , test hypothesis 1), an
ANOV 1 was performed to exa mine the interaction
between depend ence and dependency threat.

Tab le 2: AN OV A Results for th e 2x3 Dependence/ De pendency Threat Factorial
So urce of variation
1\l ain Effects
Dependence (D)
Dependen cy Threat Severity (TS)
Int{'raction Effects (0 x TS) l
Rcs
Explam cd
1d ua
Total

OF

MS

F

Pro b.

I

447806.97
517 180.04
545-1 66. 16
498-12 0.38
167625.68
183683 .68

2.67
3.09
3.25
2.973

. 105
.050
.043
.015

2
2
5
98
103

As seen in table 2, the interacti o n tem1 between
depe ndence and dependency threat severi ty wa s
statistica ll y s ignificant. T hi s finding supports hypot hesis
1. In o rder to fu ll y de tenn in c if, w hen leaders are hi ghl y
dependent on direct re poris. th e ir pay a ll ocation deci s ion s
arc directly re lated to the everity of d irect reports'
threa ts to the depe ndence re la ti onship (i.e., test

hypothes is 2) , the interacti on tenn from the previous
ANOV A had to be broken down into simple effects; the
e ffects of dependency threat se verity had to be
detennined for eac h leve l of dependence . Two separate
o ne-way ANOV As, o ne for hi g h dependence and one for
low depe nd ence conditi ons, were perfonned. Tabl e 3
con ta in s the resu lts of thi s ana lys is.

Table 3: Res ults of One-Way ANOV As of D epe nd e ncy Threat Severity on
Me rit Pay A llocation Decisions fo r Each C ondition of D e pendence
So urce of \ 'ar iati on
Hi nh D< p< nd<·nc
t" ecn Group>
Wuhm Group
Lo" Dep end ence

OF
2
52

990557 5 1
20-1007. 23

Bct\\ Cen Groups

2
-16

72088.69
126489.72

Wuhm Group>
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As seen in table 3II, the effects of dependency threat
severity on pay allocation decisions are s ignificant when
dependence is high, but not when dependence is low, just
as expected. This provides additional support for the
effects of threat severity on the pay allocation deci sion s
of leaders who are highly dependent on direct reports
who threaten the dependence relationship.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to investi gate how
dependence relationships and
threats to those
relationships are related to one another and how these
variables are useful in explaining leaders' all ocations of
resources to direct reports , particularly in a pay allocation
context. The specific research issues addressed in this
study were: 1) the interactive effects of dependence and
dependency threat on leaders' pay alloca ti on deci sion s;
and 2) the linear effects of the severi ty of direct report
threats on leaders ' pay allocati on dec isions for direct
reports upon whom they are hi ghl y dependent. In thi s
study, there was empirical support for both research
questions.
Overall, the results of thi s study provide evidence that,
under certain conclitions, leaders' pay all ocation deci sions
can be influenced by direct re ports. Direct report threats
had significant effects on leaders' pay allocati on
decisions when the leader was hi ghl y dependent on the
direct report. These finding s replicate those o f previous
research (Bartol & Martin , 1990; 1989) . In additi on, the
direct relationship between the severi ty of the direct
report ' s threat and the amount of pay a ll ocated was
supported. This is a unique contribution of thi s work, as it
is the first study to include several leve ls of threa t
severity; allowing the investigation of its lin ear effects on
pay allocation decisions .
The practical implications deri ved from thi s study
apply to direct reports and to organi za ti ons. Direct reports
are given information regardin g the types of behaviors
effective in influencing their leaders and orga ni zati ons
are given information which would all ow them to better
understand the resource allocati on dec isions that are
made by their leaders. More spec ifi ca ll y, do in g the thin gs
necessary to create dependen ce and threatenin g the
dependency relationship once establi hed were th e
behaviors found to be effecti ve . Although most of the
factors which increa se the amount of depend ence a leader
has on a direct report are situationa l, direct re pot1s ca n
increase the amount of depend ence the leader has on
them by increasing their performan ce and by establi shin g
connections to powerful others in the organi zati on

(Kanter, 1977). Direct reports wishin g to gain large
resource allocations from the ir leaders mu st not onl y
create a situation in which the leader is dependent on
them, but mu st al so threaten the dependency relati onship.
Direct reports need to be certain the influ ence attempt
will be perceived in the manner intended . Sometimes,
there are negative consequences associated with the use
of more severe influence attempts (Freedman, 1978;
K otter, 1978; Thacker & W ayne, 1995; Wortman &
Lin senme ier, 1977). Finall y, direct reports need to be
aware that certain allocators do not respond to any issues
other than performance w hen makin g pay all ocation
dec is ions. With these alloca tors, direct reports woul d be
wise to avo id any type of influence attempt other than
providing the allocator with rational, performance-based
reason s behind their request for a pay increase. Therefo re,
deciding upon an appropriate tack should be exercised
w ith care.
Organi zati ons need to understand that when makin g
pay allocation decisions, the ir leaders may be influenced
solely by direct report performance or by the existence of
a threatened dependency re lationship between the leader
and a direct report. Depending on the c ircu mstances , one
may be encouraged over the other. For example, if the
culture wa s built on " fair and equi ta bl e treatment for all ",
then the organi zation would proba bl y want to encourage
a ll ocators to focus solely on perfo rmance. O n the other
hand , if the organizati on was experi encin g high employee
turnover and tight labor market conditions, it might want
to encourage its leaders to do whatever wa s necessary to
retai n cri ti cal empl oyees.
Future resea rch on the de pendence-dependency threat
interaction mi ght begi n to look at severa l d imens ions of
dependency threats besides the severity d imension
in vestiga ted in thi s study. Such d imens ion s inc lude threat
type , impli c it-expli cit natu re of threats , threat
legitimacy, so urce cred ib ili ty, freque ncy of threat
behavior, and number of others invo lved . Research is
needed w hi c h exa mines the effects of differen t types of
threa ts on leaders' resource all ocation decisions. For
exa mpl e, differences tn the resu ltin g allocation s
depending on w hether the di rect repotis use influen ce
attempts s uch as threats to go above the lea der 's head to a
h igher source in the organ ization versu s threa tening to
qu it need to be identified . T he impli ci t versus explicit
nature of the threa t a lso sho ul d be inves tigated . Perhaps
o ne is more e ffect ive than another in onvincing a leader
to co mply. Source credib ili ty is extreme ly important in
de termin in g the success of the infl uence attempt. One
may not obta in compli ance from the leade r if th e leader
docs not be lieve the subordinate ca n actua ll y can·y
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thro ugh on the threa t. Of course, the leader may also not
respond to th e threat because the threat is not perceived to
be legitimate. Ln other words, the source of the threat may
be credib le, but the parti c ular threat used i not. The
frequency with which the direct report threaten s the
dependence relationship may also determine the success
of the influence attempt.
Leaders who are continuall y threatened by a single
direct report may possibly grow tired of thi s behavior and
eventua lly either not respond to the direct report or
respond in a negative way. Likewise, the number of other
direct reports who also threaten the leader may determin e
the success of the influence attempt. There are limited
resources to be di stributed and the leader may not be ab le
to comply with severa l requests for significant increases
because, as more money is allocated to one direct report,
it leaves less money to be allocated to the others.
Other issues for future research pertain to the
relationship between the al locator and the direct repo1i
that is making the threat. As was indi cated previously,
some allocators do not look beyond perfo rmance when
making merit-based allocations; others are more
susceptible to "outside" influences and threats from direct
reports. Therefore, the effects of the personality of the
a llocator should be investigated. Also, the nature of the
relationship between the allocator and direct report
maki ng the threat should be in vesti ga ted. Seemingly, the
better the relationship between the two parties, the more
likely the influ ence attempt by the direct report will be
successful. Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) theory
(Graen & Schiemann, 1978) proposes that a leader
establishes special relationships wi th a sma ll group of
fol lowers (the " in-group") that benefit greatly from the
relationship, whil e the rema ining followers (the ''o utgroup") get fewer rewards, such as the leader ' s time,
attention , and critica l reso urces controlled by the leader.
The current study has several limi tation that need to
be addressed . F irst, although thi s study looked at the pay
allocation dec ision s of prac ticing man agers, it is sti II
considered a laboratory experiment; therefo re, the
generalizability of the res ul ts co mes into question. For
example, in thi s study, the subj ects (leaders) did not have
any contact wi th the hypothetica l direct reports.
Therefore, there is no hi story of a re lationsh ip between
them. Becau e of the lack o f interaction between the
leader and direct rep01i, there were also no orgct ni zati onal
ramifications for th e leader co mpl yin g with the focal
direct report' s request or denyi ng it. In orga ni za tion s,
leaders have to li ve w ith the ir decision s. They interac t
with direct rep01is on a daily basis. They mo re than likely
would have to justify any recommendation s to their

https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol2/iss2/10

superiors. These conditions did not exist in the presem
study.
Another possible issue affecting generali zability may
be related to the allocator's perceptions of being
threatened. It is entirely possible that some allocators
may not respond to certain types of influence attempts.
More specifically, those with previous allocation
experience may have seen direct reports in the past
threaten certain actions and then not follow through. In a
sense, these "experienced" allocators become "immune"
to certain forms of threats and only respond after the
threat passes a certain " threshold". In this study, analyses
of the manipulation checks revealed that "experienced"
allocators perceived the high threat severity condition to
be significantly more severe than the medium threat
severity condition, but did not perceive any differences
between the medium and low threat severity conditions.
On the other hand, " inexperienced" allocators perceived
the medium threat severity condition to be significantly
more severe than the low threat severity condition, but
did not perceive any differences between the medium and
hi gh threat severity conditions. Of course, while
plausit .;, this hypothesis was not tested and therefore
remains spec ulation. It warrants further investigation in
future research.
Other limitations to thi s investigation involve context
issues. The current study was conducted in a banking
context. Pay all ocators from other industries and
backgrounds need to be examined . For example, as was
di sc ussed previously, possessing speciali zed skills is one
factor that may make a leader more dependent on a
partic ular direct rep01i. Certain indu stties (e.g. , biotech
or public accounting) have a greater proportion of jobs
whi ch req uire more spec iali zed skills than other
industri es (e.g., quick-service restaurants or retail). The
relationships found in the current study may still hold (or
maybe even found to be stronger).
Dependence and dependency threat issues deserve furth er
attention . In this study, leaders' pay allocation deci sions
were significantly affected when the leader was
dependent on the direct report and when the direct report
threatened th e dependence relation ship . In addition, under
high dependence conditions, the more severe the
dependen cy threat, the larger the amount allocated.
However, it appears that perhaps some leaders are not as
susceptible to influences outside of those warranted by
th e design of the pay a ll oca tion system. Those leaders
th at are susceptible to outside influences may al so vary in
their susceptibi li ty to attempts by direct reports to
influence the ir deci sions. Poss ibl y, experienced allocators
are not influenced by the same type of attempts as
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inexperienced allocators. More work is needed in these
areas in order to gain a more complete understanding of
leaders' resource allocation behavior.
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